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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
THOMAS D. MORGAN*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
not the nation's leading administrative law court. That is no criticism
of the Seventh Circuit; it simply reflects the fact that most major ad-
ministrative law cases are brought in the District of Columbia-the
home of the federal agencies.
Of course the definition of "administrative law" is by no means
uniform. If one believed the editors of West Publishing Company
headnotes, for example, he would concluded that this year only two
cases in the Seventh Circuit decided "administrative law and proce-
dure" issues.' Moreover those constituted such trivial questions that
almost no one would find them significant.
However I agree with most writers today who consider that ad-
ministrative law covers a very broad field. A definition I find useful
is that administrative law encompasses "the law relating to the internal
operation of government." Such a definition includes, for example,
review of decisions of the Social Security Administration, draft boards,
welfare agencies, and the like, in addition to decisions of traditional
regulatory agencies. Applying this broad a definition, one could con-
clude that the Seventh Circuit has decided thirty or more administrative
law cases of which nine seem worthy of discussion here.
1. A Case of Excessive Judicial Review: H & H Tire Co. v.
U.S. Dept. of Transportation.2
Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966, the Department of Transportation issued "Standard 117"
which in essence required that retreaded tires meet most of the per-
formance safety criteria previously set for new tires. The retread
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. The cases are Papercraft Corp. v. Federal Trade Commiss, 472 F.2d 927 (7th
Cir. 1973), and H & H Tire Co. v. United States Dep't of Transportation, 471 F.2d
350 (7th Cir. 1972).
2. 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972).
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standard was developed by informal rule making procedures, during
and after which the producers of retreaded tires argued that the re-
quirements should be somewhat less than those finally promulgated.
When the agency's substantive decision thus went against them,
several retreading firms sought judicial review. The Seventh Circuit
reversed on two related grounds. First, the court held that the Depart-
ment of Transportation "failed to inquire adequately into" the cost to
the retreaders of meeting the proposed standard as compared to the
cost of meeting a lesser level of safety.' Second, the court reasoned
that many people buy retreaded tires because they are cheaper and ex-
pressed concern that a requirement of comparable safety would both
deny people the freedom of choice and weaken a form of competition
that helps keep new tire prices at reasonable levels."
The opinions bear the mark of fine judges attempting to look
behind the record and correct what they saw to be an injustice done
the petitioners and indirectly done the public. However the case illus-
trates the potential pitfalls in such judicial activism. How, for exam-
ple, is the agency to make the record the court demands here? Al-
most all hard figures on cost and practicality are in the possession
of the companies. In most cases the agency quite reasonably expects
the firms to come forward with them. If this decision means that
a company or trade association can complain that an agency did not
"consider" what the firm chose to withhold, it would seem to put
gamesmanship above truth seeking in the administrative process. If
the court has held simply that the agency must "inquire" whether
such data is available and what it shows, it surely has added a meaning-
less formality to the procedure. If the court means that the agency
must accept all the companies' data as true, it surely has substituted
its judgment for the agency's.
Furthermore, the court's objective of providing consumers with
a lower-cost alternative to new tires can be looked at in at least two
ways. Surely, for example, the court would not argue that the Food
& Drug Administration must allow sale of dangerous drugs just because
they are cheaper and permit a "choice." There surely must be some
minimum level of safety an agency can require almost regardless of
cost, even if a laissez-faire approach would dictate that the poor have
a "right" to drive unsafe cars. Equally important, the relation between
3. Id. at 355.
4. The argument is made most explicit in the concurring opinion of Judge
Stevens, id. at 356, which the court explicitly adopts, id. at 355.
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the cost of producing retreads and the price to the consumer may not
be as direct as the court implies. While the price of new tires sets
a practical ceiling on the price of retreads, it does not follow that the
price of retreads will be set at "cost." The degree of public demand
for retreads will be an important factor in the price that can be ob-
tained. If the industry is sufficiently oligopolistic that an anticompeti-
tive price can be sustained, the court's argument that cost savings will
be passed on to the consumer may be illusory. What the court de-
scribes as a decision in the interests of consumers may be primarily
effective to expand the profit margins of retreaders. Such a result
is, of course, not itself an evil. It suggests once again, however, that
complex questions of the needs of safety and the likely effects of deci-
sions should be left in most cases to the responsible administrative
agency, not second-guessed by the courts.
2. The Welfare Recipient's Right to a Hearing: Brown v. Hous-
ing Authority of Milwaukee and Johnson v. Illinois Dep't oj
Public Aid.
One of the most important Supreme Court decisions in recent
years was Goldberg v. Kelly,5 in which the Court held that a welfare
recipient has a right to an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of
welfare benefits. While denying that the hearing need be a full-fledged
trial, the Court required at least a detailed notice of the reasons for
a proposed termination and the right to present evidence and confront
adverse witnesses. Since Goldberg the lower courts have been trying
to apply it-and regulations developed pursuant to it-in concrete
cases.
Many such decisions have read Goldberg broadly. In Mothers' &
Children's Rights Organization v. Sterrett,6 for example, the Seventh
Circuit earlier in 1972 had upheld a class action enjoining a change
in Indiana welfare eligibility rules. No factual issues were presented,
so the state argued Goldberg was inapplicable. The court held, how-
ever, that while no evidentiary or "trial-type" hearing need be held,
there must be an "adequate opportunity for argument" afforded. 7
Two important cases within the past year dealt with the issues
again. Both concerned problems of residents of public housing proj-
ects and the two panels of the Seventh Circuit which heard the cases
5. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
6. 467 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1972).
7. Id. at 800.
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reached apparently inconsistent results. In Brown v. Housing Author-
ity of Milwaukee,' a class action on behalf of all tenants in federally-
financed low-rent housing in Milwaukee sought to prohibit evictions
made without the Goldberg-type hearing required by HUD Circular
RHM 7465.9. The court held that this Circular was validly issued
under the rule-making power of HUD and that its requirements could
be imposed on the agency as a condition on the making of the federal
housing loan. In addition, the court held that while some factual
issues could be raised by a tenant as defenses to a forcible entry and
detainer action in the Wisconsin state court, such a proceeding was
not the prior factual hearing that HUD (and by inference Goldberg
v. Kelly) had demanded.9
In Johnson v. Illinois Department of Public Aid,10 on the other
hand, the class action was brought in the face of an increase of rentals
in public housing. It argued that the rent increase would effectively
serve to evict those tenants who could not afford to pay it. The suit
sought (a) a hearing on the rent increase, or (b) an order increasing
their welfare allotment by enough to pay it. The case is clearly a
step beyond what was asked in Brown, but the court's approach was
more different than the factual distinctions dictated. First, it specifi-
cally found that the validity of RHM 7465.9 was subject to question
and thus could not be relied on."" Furthermore, and directly contrary
to Brown, it found that the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act
granted a tenant sufficient notice and hearing to satisfy all federal re-
quirements.12
One can quite reasonably argue that the result of both cases is
correct. Raising rent across the board is distinguishable from selective
evictions. The issues in the latter case surely should require more of
a factual hearing than the former. On the other hand, in Sterrett,
8. 471 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1972).
9. Id. at 68-69.
10. 467 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1972).
11. In part, this problem may have arisen from less than adequate briefing by
counsel. Indeed the court reveals that the existence of the HUD Circular was not even
called to the attention of the District Judge and the court of appeals only heard
about it at oral argument. 467 F.2d at 1272. Further, the district court decision
raising doubts about the validity of the circular had been reversed by the time Brown
was decided. Housing Authority of City of Omaha v. United States Housing Au-
thority, 54 F.R.D. 402 (D. Neb. 1972), rev'd, 468 F.2d I (8th Cir. 1972).
12. The court stressed that Illinois cases holding that civil rights violations or
other equitable defenses can be raised to the forcible entry and detainer hearing.
E.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). However
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held to the same effect even earlier in Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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decided only three months earlier, the court had seemed to say that
a hearing is required for even general, nondiscriminatory changes in
policy. If that is true, Johnson is that much harder to justify. In
any event, however, it is disconcerting to have three cases decided
within a year by panels of the same circuit which do not cite each
other or otherwise acknowledge the others' existence. Such confusion
probably exists in other circuits as well, but it may not be inappro-
priate to suggest respectfully that an en banc consideration of one of
the next good cases on this subject could pull together the positions
of the various panels and provide more clear guidance to lower courts
and litigants on what is a troublesome issue in welfare adminsitration.
3. More on Hearings, This Time the Teachers: Lipp v. Bd.
of Educ. of Chicago and Hastings v. Bd. of Jr. College Dist.
No. 515.
Board of Regents v. Roth13 is yet another significant Supreme
Court decision still making ripples if not waves in the lower courts.
In Roth, an assistant professor at a state university had been hired
for one year and given timely notice that he would not be reappointed.
He was not, however, given either the reason for nonreappointment
or an opportunity to challenge the decision. The Seventh Circuit had
affirmed the district court's order that the school must offer both the
reasons for nonreappointment and a hearing at which to challenge
those reasons. The Supreme Court had then reversed, holding that
no hearing was required where the school "did not make any charge
against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations
in his community . . . [or impose] a stigma or other disability that
foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment oppor-
tunities.""'
Two interesting cases in the Seventh Circuit this year have pre-
sented Roth-type issues. In Lipp v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago,'5 a full-
time, temporarily-certified substitute teacher was "transferred to a less
desirable teaching position" after his principal had put in his efficiency
rating that he "has a negative attitude toward the school as an institu-
tion" and has an "extreme anti-establishment obsession." The first
question presented was whether these comments created a sufficient
"stigma" that the plaintiff should be able to refute them at a hearing.
The Seventh Circuit held they did not. "Not every remark," court said,
13. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
14. Id. at 573.
15. 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
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"which may arguably affect one's reputation violates due process if
made by a government official without a hearing."' 6
The court's conclusion was probably correct since an allegation
of "transfer to a less desirable teaching position" seems sufficiently
vague and too short of the dismissal in Roth to state a cause of action.
The question of "stigma," however, seems harder. A statement that
a teacher "has a negative attitude toward the school as an institution"
is a serious charge that presumably any potential employer might hold
against him. "An extreme anti-establishment obsession" again seems
more than an insignificant passing remark. If one reads Roth as im-
pliedly granting a right to keep one's personnel file free of potentially
damaging information that is not in fact true,17 then perhaps Mr. Lipp
should have been given a hearing through which to assert that right.
Roth leaves as many questions open as it answers, but in a clearer
case of firing on the basis of remarks such as those made here, it
seems that a hearing should be ordered.
Hostrop v. Bd. of Jr. College Dist. No. 51518 presented a similar
issue, but this time the case involved the president of a junior college
who was terminated without hearing, allegedly because of a confiden-
tial memorandum he had written suggesting consideration of changes
in the college's ethnic studies program. Exactly the same panel that
decided Lipp held here, without so much as mentioning Lipp, that
Dr. Hostrop was entitled to a hearing to clear his name. It is apparent
from the opinion that the court believed the President had been hur-
riedly and imprudently dismissed, but it is hard to rationalize this case
with Lipp. Here the Board acted promptly but said nothing. How
it "stigmatized" Dr. Hostrop is nowhere made clear in the opinion.
The court refers to his having a two-year employment contract and
argued that this gave him a "property right" to his job. However this
was a Civil Rights Act suit, not a contract action and the significance
of the contract seems questionable.' 9 It may well be that the Court
"did justice" to both Mr. Lipp and Dr. Hostrop, but for those trying
to advise school districts on how properly to proceed, somewhat more
clearly integrated decisions would have been useful.
16. Id. at 805.
17. This view of Roth was reinforced by the Court's decision in the companion
case of Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), in which the Court allowed a junior
college teacher a hearing in which to try to show that he had in fact been fired because
of his public criticism of the Board of Regents.
18. 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972).
19. No issue of "implied tenure" was presented here as had been argued in Perry
v. Sinderman, supra n.17.
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4. Firing of Public Employees Generally-Illinois State Em-
ployees Union v. Lewis.
Teachers were not the only persons complaining about the condi-
tions of their dismissal during the term. In Illinois State Employees
Union v. Lewis, 20 employees of the infamous, late Paul Powell alleged
that their dismissal by the new Illinois Secretary of State was due solely
to their failure to become Republicans. The district court entered
summary judgment for the state and the court of appeals reversed.
The panel wrote three separate opinions.
In the first and longest opinion, Judge Stevens noted that Roth
negated any idea that these employees had a right to a hearing before
dismissal. However, although Roth allowed dismissal for no reason,
it did not allow firing for a specific, impermissable reason. Dismissal
from public employment on the sole basis of political belief is illegal,
Judge Stevens said, and the matter is not such a political question
as to prevent the court's stepping in.
Judge Kiley, in dissent, pointed out that the Second Circuit had
reached precisely the opposite result in Alomar v. Dwyer21 on the
ground that civil service statutes were the sole basis for protection of
a state employee's job. The employees here, as those in Dwyer,
were hired on the basis of politics and could be fired on the same basis.
Judge Campbell concurred with Judge Stevens but solely because he
believed himself bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Perry v.
Sindermann,22 a companion case of Roth, which had been decided after
Alomar and which said that a teacher could not be fired for stating
his private political beliefs. Judge Campbell thought the application
to this case was direct.
The issue presented is obviously an important one and it is unfor-
tunate that the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Judge Stevens' opin-
ion is logical and scholarly but one almost gets the feeling it must
be tongue-in-cheek. It is good law in the abstract to say that the
government may not fire a person for his political beliefs. However
superimposing such a rule on the existing structure of public employ-
ment will not remove politics from the process; it will simply freeze
in the political personalities of today. A Civil Service System at least
begins non-politically; a system imposed by judicial fiat starts from
20. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1973).
21. 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed
with the Second Circuit in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
22. 408 U.S. 593 (1972), discussed in n. 17 & 19 supra.
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an already "corrupted" base. In any event, it will be interesting to
see whether earlier challenges to the "employment policies" of Mayor
Daley's Chicago organization,23 heretofore dismissed on the authority
of Alomar, will be resurrected now that Lewis is the law of the
Seventh Circuit.
5. Time for Review of Draft Board Decisions: Kochlacs v. Lo-
cal Bd. No. 92.
The move to an all-volunteer armed force did not come soon
enough to free the court from the need to review several cases alleging
arbitarary actions by draft boards. One presented issues arising under
the Supreme Court's decision in Oestereich v. Local Bd. No. 1124 in
which the Court had held that a Selective Service regisrant could chal-
lenge his draft classification before induction only if there were no
factual issues involved and the board's action was "basically lawless."
In Kochlacs v. Local Bd. No. 92,25 two ministers and two divin-
ity students refused their 4-D (exempt) classifications and turned in
their classification cards in "protest of the continuance of the War Se-
lective Service System." All sought court orders forbidding retaliatory
classifications by their boards. The Seventh Circuit quickly ruled
that the district court had properly dismissed the actions of all but
Kochlacs since there had not been even a threat of their reclassifica-
tion.,
Kochlacs, on the other hand, already had been ordered to report
for induction and as to him the court saw possibly more reason to
allow review. It concluded, however, that pre-induction judicial re-
view was inappropriate even as to him. He had not been prosecuted
for failure to report and had not even asked the Selective Service Sys-
tem to follow Oestereich and rescind its reclassification and order of
induction. Judge Fairchild's dissent notwithstanding, the court's re-
sult seems correct. By all indications, Kochlacs had an air-tight case
for his exemption after Oesterich, but he had not again applied for it. It
is often hard to know how much exhaustion to require, but it seems
good judicial administration here to assume the administrative board
will act properly if the case is presented to it.
23. Burns v. Elrod, No. 71 C 607 (N.D. Ill. 1972), and Shakman v. Demo-
cratic Organization of Cook County, 310 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd, 435
F.2d 267, cert. den. 402 U.S. 909 (1970).
24. 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
25. 476 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1973).
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6. The Tough Issue: Can Administrative Action be Compelled
-Jordon v. Weaver and Gautreaux v. City of Chicago.
Traditional administrative law has viewed judicial review as the
final step in the process-a confirmation or rejection of given agency
action. More recent thinking, however, recognizes that an agency's de-
cision not to act in a case often represents as important a judgment
as any the agency might make. Thus it can be argued persuasively
that implicit decisions not to alleviate discrimination, for example, are
as subject to judicial scrutiny as overt segregation decisions.
As usual, the D.C. Circuit led the way with this theory. In
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus2" it in effect ordered the
suspension of uses of DDT which the Secretary of Agriculture had
decided not to order. In Medical Committee for Human Rights v.
SEC,2 7 it held reviewable a decision by the SEC not to order Dow
Chemical Co. to include certain material in its proxy statement. The
landmark character of both cases lay in their willingness to review deci-
sions not to act in the way the plaintiffs wished.
This term the Seventh Circuit had two cases raising some of the
same kinds of issues. In Jordon v. Weaver,28 the plaintiffs alleged
that the Illinois Department of Public Aid was not processing applica-
tions for certain categorical assistance as quickly as federal regulations
demanded. The court held that a cause of action against the agency
had been stated. The case was easier than it might have been. The
Department did not allege that the limits could not be met. If it had, a
reasonable question might have been raised about a court's ordering
an administrator to do the impossible. Further, the court had a con-
venient, non-injunctive remedy available-the payment of sums which
accrued between the time the applications were in fact approved and
the time they were required to be approved by the regulation. Thus
the case presented a situation in which the court relatively conveniently
could review and correct the delinquent agency behavior.
The far more significant decision was Gautreaux v. City of Chi-
cago.2 9  Although but one episode in the story of attempts to achieve
open housing in Chicago, the court's decision this term confirms that
26. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). This result was contrary to that reached by
the Seventh Circuit in Nor-Am Agricultural Products v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th
Cir. 1970).
27. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28. 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
29. 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973).
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even a city council's implicit decision not to act is subject to judicial
review. This 2-1 decision, again in three separate opinions, affirmed
District Judge Austin's order that the Chicago Housing Authority must
ignore a state statute requiring city council approval of public housing
sites and come up with the sites for 1500 units previously ordered
by Judge Austin. To Judge Pell, in dissent, the court was directing
the Authority to ignore a statute neither unconstitutional on its face
nor directly found unconstitutional as applied. The district judge had
"pursued an improperly oblique course," he concluded, albeit in an
attempt to achieve a "commendable objective." Judge Pell apparently
would have preferred an order explicitly directing the City Council
to act.30 Judges Sprecher and Swygert agreed on the other hand, that
a district court has wide latitude in fashioning relief in civil rights
cases and found the order here not excessive under the circumstances.
The Gautreaux litigation has been sufficiently extended and there
have been sufficient suggestions of bad faith by the defendants that
perhaps it should not be seen as significant precedent for the court's
approach to less extraordinary circumstances. Would the court simi-
larly have ordered the City Council to appropriate any required match-
ing funds for the public housing, for example? We cannot known
how far the precedent of this extraordinary case extends, but it seems
that Gautreaux may fairly be read to put the Seventh Circuit in the
position of now agreeing with the D.C. Circuit that agency inaction
is potentially as reviewable as action.
CONCLUSION
While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals may not get the lion's
share of landmark administrative law cases, this term as usual it has
had its share of significant problems. If any single point stands out,
however, it is that this court seems to treat each case as a law unto
itself. Even cases decided close together in time bear little sign of
an attempt to develop a Seventh Circuit position. More attention to
this problem could be of great help to lawyers seeking to understand
and apply these cases to the concrete situations before them.
30. Judge Pell is not clear what approach would have been acceptable, but Judge
Swygert not unreasonably attributes this preference to him. Id. at 216.
